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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University 
Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
In October 1984, the EPU, in collaboration with -the 
University of Strasbourg and TEPSA, organised a conference to 
examine in detail the Draft Treaty Establishing the European 
Union. This Working Paper, presented at the conference and 
revised in light of the discussion, will appear in book form later 
in 1985 along with other studies of the Draft Treaty.
Further information about the work of the European Policy 
Unit can be obtained from the Director, at the European University 





















































































































































































PART ONE: The Draft Treaty establishing the European
Union and the Danish Constitution.
I. The Draft Treaty establishing of the European 
Union.
1. The purpose of this section is not to give legal 
evaluation - let alone a political one - on the 
merits of the Draft Treaty establishing the European 
Union. It is rather to provide some preliminary 
information as to the constitutional process required 
in Denmark should this draft be submitted for appro­
val in Denmark.
2. A few general remarks may, however, be called for. From 
the point of view of a lawyer who has to check into 
the compatibility of the Draft with the national 
Constitution it is striking that although the Draft 
is based on clear principles and ideas it contains 
quite some measure of ambiguity. No doubt part of 
this is due to the inability of the present reporter 
to fully comprehend all the intentions behind the 
various articles and paragraphs in the Draft. Part of 
the ambiguity is on the other hand unquestionably 
contained in the basic approach chosen by the Euro­
pean Parliament.
a. While the Draft is based on the "acquis communi- 
taire", the future legal position of the basic Commu­
nity Treaties is only defined in the broadest terms. 
The Community Treaty provisions relating to the 
objectives and scope of the Treaties are part of the 
law of the Union, but only in so far as they are not 
explicitly or implicitly amended by the new Treaty. 
Though not formally a part of the new Treaty they 




























































































All other provisions of the Community Treaties which 
are not incompatible with the new Treaty are also 
law of the Union, but subject to amendmends through 
the procedure for organic laws.
We would suggest that the determinations as to which 
provisions of the Community Treaties concerns their 
objectives and scope opens up an area of great legal 
uncertainty. Likewise it is impossible to have an 
exact idea as to which of those provisions that have 
been implicitly or explicitly amended by the new 
Treaty.
Finally the determination of any incompatibility of 
the "other" Treaty provisions with the new Treaty is 
marked by the same kind of legal uncertainty.
A few examples may illustrate some of the diffi­
culties:
- Does article 235 of the Rome-Treaty concern the 
"Scope" of that Treaty? In the affirmative should it 
be considered that the objectives in Article 9 of the 
Draft have explicitly or implicitly replaced Art. 2 
of the Rome-Treaty with respect to the objectives 
which may be pursued under Article 235?
If Article 235 is applicable under the Draft it is 
conceivable that not only the legislature may apply 
it, but also the European Council with respect to 
cooperation matters, and if so will the requirement 
of unanimity be maintained?
- Do Article 30-36 and Article 48 paragraph 4 (which 
makes an exception for the free movement of workers 
with respect to the public administration) of the 




























































































and scope" of the Rome-Treaty, and in the affir­
mative have these provisions been implicitly or 
explicitly amended through Article 47 of the Draft 
relating to free movements?
These are only a few of many questions which we feel 
unable to answer with any reasonable degree of cer­
tainty.
b. It seems certain that the new Draft does involve fun­
damental amendmends of the basic Treaties without 
however respecting the procedures laid down in 
Article 236 of the Rome-Treaty and the equivalent 
provisions of the other basic Treaties. This of 
course raises delicate problems which are dealt 
withbelow under chapter VII.
c. The distinction - conceptually clear - between common 
action and cooperation also seems in the legal sphere * 
to raise a number of questions. In particular: 
through what legal instruments is the cooperation 
exercised and executed. The European Council - the 
primary centre for cooperation - may pursuant to 
Article 32 undertake commitments in the fields of 
cooperation. Are such commitments part of the law of 
the Union which is directly applicable in the Member 
States pursuing to Art. 42? And to what extent is 
the Court competent to interprète and ajudicate with 
respect to such commitments!
Art. 10 paragraph 2 defines common action as all the 
internal and external acts of the Union including 
among other things recommendations from the Union 
institutions. According to Art. 46 the Commission and 
the Parliament may adopt recommendations with a 
respect to cooperation undertakings regarding "espSce 




























































































pean Council may adopt recommendation regarding all 
matters of cooperation pursuant to Article 32. 
It would logically seem to follow that such recom­
mendations -unintentionally - would bring a coope­
ration action under the area of common action.
For the purpose of this paper we will assume that 
cooperation matters are dealt with as intergovern­
mental cooperation. To the extent that this assump­
tion may be erroneous the subsequent evaluation of 
the constitutional implications in Denmark has to be 
reconsidered.
II. The Danish Constitution.
1. The Danish Constitution in its present form was 
adopted in 1953. Compared to other constitutions it 
is singularly difficult to amend. Consequently, 
amendments to the Constitution are the extreme 
exception in Danish constitutional life. In this 
century, the Constitution has only been amended in 
1915 and in 1953. The requirements for amending the 
Constitution are contained in section 88 of the 
Constitution. According to this section a bill to 
amend the Constitution which has been passed by the 
Parliament - "Folketing" - under the procedure for 
ordinary laws must be presented once more to a newly 
elected "Folketing". The new "Folketing" must then 
adopt the same constitutional text without any 
further amendments. Following the second adoption the
approval with a simple majority. However, the votes 
in favour of the amendment must in any case amount to
proposal shall be submitted for for




























































































This very cumbersome procedure (which was even more 
stringent prior to 1953) has in fact led to a kind of 
a politico-constitutional common wisdom that only 
amendments passed in unanimity by all major political 
parties and likely to be of such popular interest 
that a major turnout to the polls can be secured can 
be considered in Denmark.
2. It was exactly this very cumbersome procedure for 
amending the Constitution which led professor^' Max 
Sorensen to suggest to the Parliament in 1952 that 
provisions might be inserted allowing for transfer of 
constitutional powers to international authorities 
without amending the Constitution. The Danish Consti­
tution, originally drafted in 1849 under strong 
influence from the Belgium Constitution of 1831 was 
inspired by the Dutch Constitutional provision with 
regard to transfer of sovereignty to international 
authorities. The text proposed by Max Sorensen 
suggested that such transfer of sovereignty could be 
decided by an ordinary bill. However, a certain 
minority in the "Folketing" would have the right to 
request that such a bill be ratified by the next 
elected "Folketing" prior to its entry into force. In 
the political process necessary to achieve unanimity 
among all major political parties on the constitu­
tional amendments in 1953 the procedure for adoption 
of such bill was however dramatically a m e n d e d A  
majority of 5/6 of the total "Folketing" (i.e. 150
members out of the 179 members must vote in favour) 
is required. If this majority is not obtained, though 
simple majority is secured, the bill can only be 
promulgated if it has been submitted to a referendum 
in accordance with section 42 Tsf the Constitution. 
Pursuant to this section a bill adopted by Parliament 
can be rejected by the electorate if a majority votes 




























































































the total electorate. The provisions of section 20 
have only been used twice since 1953. The first time 
was Denmarks accession to the European Communities. 
The bill for accession did not obtain the required 
5/6 and was consequently submitted for a referendum 
where it received the consent of almost 2/3 of those 
voting amounting to more than 50% of the total 
electorate.
The second time of application of section 20 was the 
conventions for the European patent and for a Commu­
nity patent. The bill for Danish accession to these 
conventions did not receive the 5/6 majority. The 
bill has been considered unfit for a referendum and 
is therefore still on the government's table.
The procedural aspects of the Danish provision 
regarding transfer of sovereignty to international 
authorities differ considerably from those of other 
Member States if not qualitatively then at least 
quantitavely. Also the substantive provisions regard­
ing transfer of sovereignty seem somewhat more 
strict in Denmark than in other Member States. The 
text of section 20 paragraph 1 reads as follows:
"Powers vested in the authorities of the Realm 
under this Constitution Act may to such extent as 
shall be provided by statute be delegated to 
international authorities set up by mutual agree 
ment with other States for the promotion of in­
ternational rules of law and cooperation."
The theoretical background for the provision is ex­
plained by Max S0rensen in the following manner in 




























































































"Ii: iis'*’ a fundamental principle in Danish con­
stitutional law that legal authority»' ;vis-a-vis 
citizens is exercised by organs directly estab­
lished pursuant to the Constitution or which, in 
any case, are a part of the Danish constitutional 
system. The legislative power lies primarily -in 
the elected assembly. The executive power lies 
with the ministers responsible towards the 
"Folketing" with the elected municipal councils 
or with independent executive agencies which, 
however, are subject to the Danish legal system 
as regards the regulation of their responsibili­
ty. The judicial power rests with the independent 
courts instituted by the Constitution. It is true 
that the legislative power may within certain 
limits delegate its competence to other organs 
and it may to a certain extent change the distri­
bution of competence between the courts and the 
administration, but this does not authorize it to - 
transfer powers to organs which are outside the 
Danish constitutional system. Such a transfer of 
competence would not be possible without amending 
the Constitution as it would violate the said 
fundamental principle that authority over citi­
zens are exercised by Danish organs".
"Any power which pursuant to the Constitution is 
exercised by the authorities of the Kingdom may 
be transferred pursuant to Section 20. When this 
provision speaks of powers vested in the authori­
ties of the realm under this Constitution Act, it 
is not only the specified competences in the 
Constitution, such as the King's right to cause 
money to be coined in section 26, but also the 
broad categories of constitutional competences 
spelled out in section 3 of the Constitution" 




























































































executive power and the judicial power respec­
tively) .
"The powers vested in the authorities of the 
Realm to which section 20 refers do not include 
the power to amend the Constitution. Pursuant to 
section 88 only the legislative power and the 
electorate in combination can exercise this 
power, and it is therefore not exercised by an 
authority in the sense of section 20. It is 
therefore not possible to transfer to an inter­
national authority the power to amend the Con­
stitution, for instance to determine that the 
form of government should be republican, that 
foreigners be given voting rights, that a person 
who is taken into custody is not required to be 
brought before a judge within 24 hours or that 
expropriation is possible without due compensa­
tion. It is however obvious that the very trans­
fer of powers provided for in section 20 may to a 
certain extent amend the Constitution in the 
sense that the powers will no longer be exercised 
by Danish authorities as presumed in the Consti­
tution, but by the international authority to 
whom the powers have been transferred. In other 
words, section 20 allows for the amendment of the 
system of competence established by the Constitu­
tion, whereas the material conditions for or 





























































































III. Section 20 and the substantive provisions of the
1. It is possible to read Art. 45 in such a way that 
this article which refers to Art. 9 concerning the 
objectives of the Union gives the general delimi­
tation of the powers of the Union"ratione materiae". 
According to such an interpretation the Union would 
be able to legislate, take executive action and 
actions with respect to third countries covering all 
subject matters referred to in Art. 9. The competence 
of the Court would obviously cover the same fields.
Given the fact that the aims of the Union in Art. 9 
are described in the broadest possible terms such in­
terpretation would in fact imply that the Union had 
unlimited competence. Under Section 20 of the Consti­
tution , however, competence may only be transferred 
to an extent to be provided by statute. In his text 
book on constitutional law Max Sorensen states that:
"this condition imply that there must be a 
certain level of precision with respect to the 
powers to be transferred.
Negatively, it may be said that it is excluded to 
transfer all legislative competence or judicial 
competence in general etc. Even less it would be 
possible to transfer all powers belonging to 
Danish authorities and thus abolish Denmark as an 
independent State.
The required level of precision implies that the 
powers are clarified with respect to their kind,- 
legislation, administration, judicial decisions
matter. The comparable provision in the Norwegian
Draft.




























































































Constitution section 93 uses the words "within a 
materially limited field". The Danish provision 
must be understood in this sense. It is conse­
quently required that all decisions which may be 
taken by the international organ are defined with 
respect to their subject matter or object.
On the other hand it cannot be demanded that this 
delimitation should be formulated in a narrow 
way. There is no quantitative criteria in the 
wording of the Constitution. There is no basis 
for implying any demand that the transfer can 
only be made within a limited scope meaning 
within few subject matters or within areas of 
lesser importance.
Consequently, nothing prevents powers to be 
transferred with respect to subject matters 
defined in broad categories such as the provi­
sions in the Treaty of Rome concerning the 
European Economic Community, in particular Art. 
3. "
It is obvious that under the above given interpre­
tation of Art. 45 Section 20 would be inapplicable. 
Only a full- scale constitutional amendment could be 
used in such a case.
On the other hand it would seem from the general 
scheme of the Draft that the intention has been that 
the Union may only exercise competences pursuant to 
the individual articles of chapter 1 - 3 of part 4 
and part 5 regarding the finances of the Union. If 
this assumption is correct and Art. 45 therefore 
could be clarified in this respect without any change 




























































































delimitations given in the various chapters in part 4 
and part 5 of the Draft.
Compared to the competence of the present Communities 
the Union's competence seems to be enlargened in dif­
ferent ways:
- new areas of activities such as education, culture 
and health are added.
- The union competence in areas where the Community 
has only a very limited competence such as .taxation 
and social affairs is greatly increased. The compe­
tence to impose taxes and collect the revenue as 
"own income" is even without limits in the Draft.
- limitations inherent in the Community Treaties with 
respect to the exercise of the competence are either 
set aside by the Union Treaty, or may possibly be set 
aside by decisions of the Union institutions. As said 
above in chapter I it is very unclear to the present 
reporter to what extent this may happen.
- the objectives of the Union provided for in Art. 9 
of the Draft is considerably wider than the objec­
tives in Art. 2 and 3 of the Rome-treaty. Given the 
impact which these objectives have for the interpre­
tation of the various substantive provisions this 
will also be a factor in enlarging the competence of 
the Union compared to the competence of the Communi­
ties.
Nevertheless, nothing would in principle exclude the 




























































































section 20 of the Constitution. As is quoted above 
from Max Sorensen there is no requirement in the 
Constitution with respect to the quantities of the 
powers transferred.
It is not possible without a very detailed study to 
see if the powers intended to be transferred by means 
of the various provisions are spelled out sufficient­
ly clear to meet the requirement of section 20. This, 
however, would rather be a matter of drafting and 
clarity than of quantity.
The clarity required does of course not imply that 
there can be no room for future interpretations. Many 
important questions with respect to the present text 
should, however, be solved prior to a possible signa­
ture of the Draft. Such questions would include:
- A clarification of Article 7 as discusssed under 
chapter I.
- Does Article 55, which gives the Union concurrent 
competence in the field of social, consumer protec­
tion, regional environmental education and research, 
cultural and information policies give the Union a 
general competence with respect to these matters 
subject only to the individual limitations in the 
following Articles?
- In Articles 57-59 and 62 the Union is given power 
to encourage the attainment of various objectives. 
Does such power limit the Union to making programmes 
which the Member States may or may not chose to 
comply with?
- Pursuant to Article 56 the Union may take action 




























































































particular in matters relating to" a number of speci­
fied objects. Does such wording imply that in fact 
any other action in the field of social and health 
policy which conforms to the broad objectives in Ar­
ticle 9 would also be possible?
- Article 4 paragraph 1 may be read to imply, that 
the Union will have as one of its tasks to ensure the 
compliance of Member States with the fundamental 
rights of the Union. It is obvious that the Union 
will be under an obligation not no violate the 
fundamental rights and not to legislate in a way 
which compels Member States to act contrary to the 
fundamental rights of the Union. However, if Article 
4 paragraph 1 is also intended to grant authority to 
the Union to protect the citizens against other 
violations of their fundamental rights, one would 
have to inquire what remedies the Union would have at 
its disposal. It appears from paragraph 4 of Art. 4 
and from Art. 44 that if Member States in their own 
rights violate the Human rights of their citizens, 
the only legal remedy for the Union is a partial 
suspension of the participation in the activities of 
the Union If this interpretation is correct it would 
seem that no powers would be transferred from Danish 
authorities in this respect.
3. It must be kept in mind that the Union may not pur­
suant to Article 20 be authorized to act contrary to 
the substantive provisions of the constitution.
If the freedom of movement with respect to persons 
would include a right to all jobs in the public 
administration, i.e. if Article 48 paragraph 4 of the 
Rome-treaty is considered contrary to Article 47 or 




























































































organic law, then this part of the Draft would 
require a constitutional amendment.
4. Article 11 of the Draft Treaty authorises the Euro­
pean Council to transfer matters of "cooperation" to 
the area of "common action". Such transfer will 
inevitably imply a corresponding transfer of compe­
tence to the Union pursuant to Section 2o.
However Section 2o of the Constitution does not allow 
the transfer of the powers contained in that section. 
In other words, the institutions of the Union may not 
be authorized via section 20 to decide to transfer 
matters from national competence to Union competence. 
The powers which are to be transferred must be deter­
mined in the statute which transfer the powers to the 
Union.
Theoretically it would be possible for the "Folke- 
ting" to transfer powers so to speak in advance in 
all cases cowered by Article 11. Such a construction 
was applied at the time of Denmarks accession to the 
EC with respect to Article 235 of the Rome-Treaty. 
Where others may consider Article 235 an instrument 
of gradual transfer of competence to the Community 
the approach taken in Denmark was to transfer in the 
bill of accession all powers to the Community with 
respect to Article 235. In this as in all other 
cases, the transfer of power is subject to the 
understanding that the powers may still be exercised 
by Danish authorities until such time as they are 
used by the Community.
However one may doubt whether it would be realistic 
to transfer in advance all powers which could be the 




























































































If decisions pursuant to Article 11 will be taken by 
unanimity it would on the other hand be possible to 
pass the necessary bills pursuant to section 20 each 
time a subject matter would be transferred from 
"cooperation" to "common action". The Danish Prime 
Minister would then have to make sure prior to his 
formal acceptance of any decision pursuant to Article 
11 that the necessary bill under Section 20 of the 
constitution had been passed.
IV.Section 20 and the supremacy of Union law over the 
fundamental rights guarantied by the Constitution.
The transfer of competence pursuant to Section 20 of 
the constitution does not imply that the recipient 
institutions may act in contravention of the funda­
mental rights guaranteed in the Danish Constitution.
The principle of the supremacy of the law of the 
Union even vis-a-vis national constitutions therefore 
raises a problem. The problem is however not new. It 
already exists in the Community as it stands.
In certain other Member States having extensive cata­
logues of fundamental rights a certain national case 
law already exists in this respect. In Denmark it has 
been considered most unlikely that a conflict would 
ever arise due to the fairly limited scope of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Danish constitu- 
tion and the limitation of the competence of the 
Community.
The practise developed by the ECJ with respect to 
fundamental rights has further eliminated the likeli­




























































































Article 4 of the Draft codifies the Court's jurispru­
dence with respect to fundamental rights and it would 
even with the expanded Union competence - be 
most unlikely that a conflict would arise. A further 
analysis of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
constitutions of the Member States might even show, 
that all relevant fundamental rights found in the 
Danish Constitution would be fully covered by the 
common principles of the constitutions of the Member 
States, which must be protected by the Court pursuant
to Article 4 of the Draft./
It would therefore seem that no new problems of 
principle would arise due to the fact that under 
section 20 of the Constitution no powers to act 
contrary to the fundamental rights of the Constitu­
tion may be transferred.
V. Section 20 and the Institutional set up of the 
Union.
1. Under Section 20 powers may be transferred to inter­
national authorities set up by mutual agreement.
Max Sorensen writes that the most important element 
in this respect is that:
"the authority shall be international. The 
transfer may thus not be made to the authorities 
of a foreign State. It is immaterial how the 
international organ is constituted and what legal 
position it has. It may be an organ composed of 
representatives of the Governments or Parliaments 
of the Member States. It may be a parliamentary 
organ elected through direct elections in the 
Member States in total, or it may be an indepen­




























































































instructions from any side, such as for instance 
the Commission of the European Communities or an 
international court."
"The international authority shall be created by 
mutual agreement. ... When the term "mutual" is 
used with respect to the agreement the aim 
undoubtedly is not only formal in the sense that 
the agreement is made by mutual obligations on 
all the participating states. The aim is also and 
in particular that the agreement must be based on 
a certain principle of equality in the sense 
that the international authority must have the 
same powers with respect to all participating 
States and that there is no discretionary discri­
mination between the participating States with 
respect to their influence in the organization. 
This does not exclude, however, that the size of 
the population or other similar quantitative 
factors are taken into account in the determi­
nation of the composition of the individual 
organs or in the voting rules or with respect to 
definition of rights and duties at large.
2. In general the Draft raises no problems with respect 
to the institutional set up of the Union.
It is however remarkable that the existing balance 
within the institutions between the larger and the 
smaller Member States has been dramatically changed 
by the Draft in favour of the larger Member States. 
The fact that this change has not been explained in 
the various papers of the European Parliament might 





























































































The transfer of power from the Council to the Parlia­
ment gives the larger Member States far more influ­
ence. This is due to the fact that the composition of 
the Parliament gives greater weight to the relative 
size of the population of each Member State than the 
voting rules of the Council.
In a pre-federal system like the Union it seems of 
course perfectly resonable, that the "Peoples Cham­
ber" is composed with due regard for the relative 
size of the populations of the Member States.
However, The same logic must ofcourse imply that in 
the "State Chamber" the States are represented with 
equally due respect for the principle of "one state 
one vote". It is therefore surprising, that the Draft 
does not involve any steps in that direction. If the 
existing balance in the instittutions between larger 
and smaller Member States should be preserved the vo 
ting rules of the Council should have been changed 
in the direction of "one State one vote".
In fact the existing voting rules for the Council 
are also changed in favour of ‘the large States. Thus 
simple majority in the Council is not necessarily a 
majority of governments represented, as is now the 
case, but may in fact be a minority consisting of no 
more than three governments of larger States out of 
the ten governments represented in the Council.
Qualified majority similarly means in fact only a 
simple majority of the governments represented in the 





























































































It is clear that the influence of the smaller Member 
States is thus reduced both by the transfer of compe­
tence from the Council to the Parliament and by the 
proposed voting rules of the Council.
The result is that the smaller States will have a 
representation which is less than what would follow 
from f.i. the US constitution.
On top of this the over-representation of the larger 
States in the Council may only be changed by amending 
the Treaty, i.e. by unanimity, whereas the - smaller 
- over-representation of the smaller States in the 
Parliament may be changed by an organic law, i.e. 
almost by the larger States alone.
On basis of these facts one might expect a discussion 
in Denmark as to the requirement of a "fair represen­
tation".
The composition of the Court and the Commission may 
also be changed by an organic law. In our view it 
would be unthinkable that the smaller Member States 
lost their seats in these two institutions. A discus­
sion with respect to these institutions would there­
fore focus on the lack of any legal guarantees in 
this respect.
3. The legal instruments available to the Union are 
mostly clear and represent a continuation of the 
Community's legal instruments.
The commitments and recommendation of the European 
Council with respect to matters of cooperation may 
however give rise to doubts as mentioned in chapter
I. The term "commitment" is thus in the Danish text 




























































































nevertheless assumed that such commitments are either 
political in nature or at any rate not part of the 
law of the Union which pursuant to Article 42 is 
directly applicable in the Member States. Under that 
assumption no powers would be transferred from Danish 
authorities to the European Council.
VI. Section 20 and the European Union as a quasi 
federation.
We have in the preceding chapters looked into some of 
the main elements in determining whether section 20 
of the Danish Constitution is of application with 
respect to the Draft presented by the European 
Parliament.
It may be expected, however, that in the event the 
Draft would be submitted to the "Folketing", an 
argument would be advanced to the effect that the 
Draft involves more loss of sovereignty than is 
permissible under section 20 of the constitution. The 
combination of the very vide Union Competence "rati- 
one materiae", the limited Danish influence in the 
decision-making process, the unlimited right of the 
Union to impose taxes and the strong position of the 
Union as a subject of international law might taken 
together be considered beyond what may be acomplished 
by virtue of section 20 of the constitution. In favor 
of this view it may be argued that the Union in fact 
is a federal State and that section 20 only covers 
transfer of powers to international authorities, and 
not to a federal state.
Against this argument it could be pointed out that 
the basic meaning of the term "international authori­




























































































competence to foreign States. The federal State would 
- in our case - not be a foreign State since Denmark 
would be a Member State. It could further be said 
that section 2o does not use the term "international 
Organization" but international authority thus 
clearly accepting that also entities which are so 
sovereign, that they would not be classified as 
international organizations may be adhered to pursu­
ant to Article 20.
We - for our part - would,however, not find it unrea­
sonable if adherence to a full-fledged federal State 
would be considered as being beyond what may be 
accomplished pursuant to section 20 of the Constitu­
tion. However the Union is clearly not a full-fledged 
federal State.
To go beyond this, and assume that adherence to a 
highly integrated Union which is not a full-fledged 
federal State could in principle not be accomplished 
via section 20 of the constitution would in our view 
not follow from the text or legislative history of 
section 20. It would, however, clearly be within the 
legitimate rights of the "Folketing" to make such a 
qualitative interpretation of Section 20. Under such 
an interpretation the application of section 20 could 
be restricted to transfer of powers of a politico- 
constitutional importance, which is consonant with 
the requirements for adopting a bill pursuant to 
Section 20. An interpretation of this kind would in 
our view imply an evaluation of the combined impact 
of all the changes proposed compared with the present 
situation under the Community Treaties.
It should be noted that the "Folketing" did not rely 
on a qualitative interpretation with respect to the 




























































































would clearly have resulted in an adoption of the 
patent Conventions pursuant to section 19 of the 
Constitution (i.e. simple majority), without appli­
cation of section 20 as these Conventions are void of 
any politico - constitutional importance.
VII. Procedures for adoption in Denmark.
1. The Danish constitution and legal tradition with 
respect to international law is the so called dua­
lism. Pursuant to section 19 of the constitution the 
King (Government) négociâtes and ratifies inter­
national treaties. The consent of the "Folketing" - 
given as a folketing resolution or in form of a bill 
is required in all important cases.
The implementation of treaties is generally subject 
to specific legislation in casu first of all a bill 
pursuant to section 20 of the constitution.
A bill containing the "Folketing" consent to rati­
fication pursuant to section 19 of the Constitution 
and provisions for transfer of powers pursuant to 
section 2o would be introduced by the Government.
2. The Draft Treaty on the European Union is obviously 
amending to basic EC - Treaties and the Danish autho­
rities are therefore obliged - on top of their own 
constitutional procedures - to follow the rules laid 
down in Article 236 of the Rome - Treaty (and the 
equivalent Articles in the other Treaties). Only 
after completion of such procedures a bill could 




























































































3. A private member of the "Folketing" could introduce 
the Draft by a "foresptfrgselsdebat" (questions to the 
Government with a formal debate). At the end of this 
debate a formal motion may be adopted which could 
express the opinion of the "Folketing" with respect 
to the Draft and request the Government to submit a 
bill as described above.
VIII. Summary and Conclusions
1. An approval by Denmark of the Draft Treaty establish­
ing a European Union would have to be made either 
through an amendment to the Constitution or by a bill 
adopted in accordance with the special procedure in 
Section 20 of the constitution governing transfer of 
powers from Danish to international authorities.
The procedure for a Constitutional amendment being 
very difficult and time- consuming the focus of 
interest lies in examining the possibility of adhe­
ring to the Draft Treaty by way of a bill pursuant to 
section 20 of the Constitution. This procedure 
, requires either a 5/6 majority in the "Folketing" or 
a simple majority coupled with a referendum.
2. The Draft Treaty uses a sometimes very broad language 
open to differing interpretations. The findings of 
this report is therefore subject to a number of 
reservations regarding the interpretations of the 
Draft.
3. The power of the European Council to transfer matters 
of cooperation to matters of common action is diffi­
cult to comply with under the terms of section 20 of 




























































































ment to the Constitution unless decisions by the 
European Council to transfer matters of cooperation 
to matters of common action is taken by unanimity.
4. The enlargened competence of the Union "ratione mate- 
riae" is in principle compatible with Section 2o of 
the Constitution. However, a number of clarifications 
in the text as to the extent of the new competences 
should be made prior to any Danish accession in order 
to comply with the requirement of section 20 that 
powers may only be transferred to such extent as 
shall be provided by statute pursuant to Section 20.
5. Pending clarifications it might be that at least one 
substantive provision of the Constitution which re­
serves certain jobs in the public administration for 
Danish nationals would have to be amended by the pro­
cedure for constitutional amendmends.
6. The explicit provisions regarding the supremacy of 
Union law would most likely not give rise to new con­
stitutional problems in Denmark because it is unli­
kely that a conflict between the fundamental rights 
of the Danish Constitution and the fundamental rights 
protected by the Union would occur.
6. The composition and voting rules for the Parliament 
and the Union Council gives the Smaller Member States 
a representation which is less than in a full- 
fledged federal State, and which could become even 
smaller if an organic law redistributed the seats in 
Parliament. A discussion in Denmark with respect to 
"fair" representation as required by section 20 of 
the Constitution, may be expected.
The legal instruments available to the European 




























































































defined. A clarification may be necessary to comply 
with section 20 of the Constitution.
7. The combined effect of all the changes contained in 
the Draft Treaty might be considered to be of such 
politico- constitutional importance that a Constitu­
tional amendmend rather than a bill pursuant to 
section 20 would be considered the most correct 
solution, but such an interpretation is probably not 



























































































































































































Part TWO: The Draft Treaty establishing a European Union 
and the political parties
I. The Danish political parties.
The following parties are represented in the "folke- 
ting" using the traditional yet sometimes erroneus 
left/right order:
Venstresocialisterne (Leftist Socialists) 5
Socialistisk Folkeparti (Peoples Socialists Party) 21 
Socialdemokratiet (Social-democratic Party) 57
(S) Det radikale Venstre (the Radical Party) 10
(G) Kristeligt Folkeparti (Christian Peoples Party) 5 
(G) Centrumsdemokraterne (the Center-democrats) 8
(G) Venstre (the Liberal Party) 23
(G) Det konservative Folkeparti (the Conservative 
Peoples Party) 42
(S) De frie Demokrater (the Free Democrats) 1
Fremskridtspartiet (the Progress Party) 5
Outside the parties (the Faroe Islands and Green 
land) 2
Total 179
The four parties with a (G) added are forming the 
government. The two parties with an (S) added are in 
general supporting the Government in domestic issues. 
This block har a practical majority as the two mem­
bers outside the parties will not both vote against 
the government on a critical issue.
The list shows that Denmark is blessed with numerous 
parties. We shall in the following concentrate on the 




























































































the Social-democratic Party, the Radical Party, the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Party.
II.The "Folketing" debate on EC-questions in May 1984
1. In May 1984 the two left wing socialist parties in 
the "Folketing" requested a debate on the following 
questions to the Government:
"Will the Foreign Minister inform the "Folketing" 
of the Government's position on the EC-policy for 
the next five years including the future finan­
cing of the EC, the plans for a union, plans for 
incorporating new areas, such as security and 
culture under the EC-cooperation, the relation 
between the institutions and the safeguarding of 
the right of veto."
The question was paret of the campaign prior to the 
elections to the European Parliament, and its formu­
lation gives an indication of the issues which the 
anti EC, parties wanted to become central in the cam­
paign.
The answer of the Foreign Minister was centered on 
the budgetary problems and the need to devolop new 
common policies for industry, tecnology, research and 
development and energy. To the Minister common 
actions in this fields:
"should be the center of gravity in discussions 
on the future of the EC rather than long term 
plans for a European union, like the draft treaty 




























































































European Parliament" "Obviously, there is always 
room for improvements and one may always find 
some grounds for criticism , but the crux of the 
matter is that by and large EC cooperation is 
functioning in a way which is satisfactory and 
which is beneficial to Denmark".
This approach similarly indicates how the four go­
vernmental parties wished to focus the debate prior 
to the European elections.
In the debate the two left wing socialist parties 
proposed a motion which was clearly designed to 
appeal to the anti EC part of the social-democratic 
and radical electorate. However, these two parties 
proposed their own motion with the following text:
"The Folketing decides, that the conservation of 
the right of veto and the maintenance of the di­
stribution of powers between the Council of Mini­
sters, the Commission and the European Parlia­
ment is the basis for Denmarks membership of the 
EC.
The Folketing consequently rejects the draft 
treaty establishing a European Union as’proposed 
by the European Parliament."
(The motion included another paragraph on the 
substantive EC cooperation)
The adoption of this motion would in all likelyhood 
have been secured by the two left wing socialist par­
ties once their own motion had been defeated. In this 
situation the four parties in Government chose to vo­




























































































The formal Danish position on the Draft Treaty is 
thus quite clear. The Draft is unequivocally rejected 
by both the opposition and the Government.
2. The most fundamental issue related to the European 
Union is no doubt the question of the approach. With 
the possible exception of the Center-democrats all 
pro EC Danish parties are clearly functionalists. In 
their view the best and in fact only possible way 
towards a Union is to make new common policies and 
strenthening the the existing ones. Such endeavours 
are supported by all major parties. We would suggest 
that in this respect Danish political parties are as 
integrationists as parties in most other Member 
States. Increases in the "own resources" of the 
Community to this end is also favoured by the major 
parties. ' This is not to suggest that proposals to 
this end would always be favoured blindly. Special 
national interests as well as party interests may of 
course call for special positions. The fundamental 
point, however , remains,that there is a general 
concensus among the major political parties in 
Denmark that new policies in the central areas of EC 
cooperation are both desirable a and necessary, and 
that Denmark as a small state is vitally dependant on 
the succesfull outcome of such policies.
As regards the institutional set up a broad concensus 
likewise exists among Danish political parties that 
the existing Treaties must remain the center and 
basis for a Union to come.
It is a very widespread feeling among Danish politi­
cians that progress in the essential fields of tecno- 
logy and industrial policy, energy policy and econo­




























































































extent by some of the same Governments to whom this 
lack of progress is taken as a proof of the need for 
a major institutional reform. In this Danish view or­
gans like those proposed by the Draft will meet the 
same resistance as the existing institutions have 
met and will consequently be unable to adopt - or 
even worse - to ensure enforcement by the Member 
States of programmes which these Member States have 
so far persistently been determined to oppose.
Major institutional reforms would therefore be a gre­
ater danger to the political authority of the insti­
tutions than the present too slow decision making 
process.
It is obvious that the Draft Treaty presented by the 
European Parliament with its strong emphasis on revi­
sing the institutions, and the fundamental absence of 
any attempt to define the future common policies must 
be felt as problematic and counterproductive by the 
major Danish political parties.
The interventions by the Foreign Minister and the 
various spokesmen of the political parties in the 
"Folketing" debate referred to above confirms this. 
With the exception of the Center-democrats the 
Government parties were clearly embarrassed by the 
Draft which "is a matter for our children to decide 
upon once they grow up" as the spokesman for the Libe­
ral Party put it. Any identification with the Draft 
was clearly seen as unhelpful in the general contest 
for seats in the European Parliament. To the Social- 
democrats and Radicals a firm rejection of the union 
was undoubtedly a way to appeal to that part of their 




























































































The "Folketing" motion af may 1984 certainly is a 
true reflection of the fundamental and contemporary 
Danish position with respect to the Draft Treaty. We 
would, however, suggest that the motion does not give 
a nuanced picture of the position of the political 
parties voting in favour of the motion. Certain fea­
tures of the Danish political scene which we shall 
examine below may explain why.
III.The fundamentals of Danish politics in EC matters.
It is the rule and not the exception that Danish Go- 
verments are minority Governments. Danish domestic 
politics are therefore based on short-term political 
alliances. In foreign policy - including EC policy - 
the major parties have, however, traditionally main­
tained a more or less permanent alliance. Danish fo­
reign policy has in this way largely been unaffected 
by any domestic instability.
This alliance implies that even in opposition the al­
liance parties excercise influence on Danish foreign 
policy. It also means that while in opposition the 
parties cannot - as in most other countries - exploit 
their lack of responsibility to recapture votes lost 
due to foreign policy decisions.
Over the last years serious rifts have shown in the 
alliance on external policy between the Social-demo­
cratic Party and the government.This is not the place 
to analyse these rifts. Below we shall provide some 
information on the reasons for the rifts with respect 
to EC matters. Here we would only stress that the 
parties of the present Government for want of any 




























































































policy motions by the "Folketing" which were clearly 
not to their liking.In other words the nuances of 
opinion among the major political parties may not al 
ways be deduced from the "Folketing" motions under 
the circumstances prevailing in the Danish political 
life.This is in particular so with respect to the Li­
beral and Conservative parties to whom no viable al­
ternative to the big foreign policy alliance has 
existed so far. Thus the two non-socialist Govern­
ments which have been in existence since 1973 have 
both had to accept "Folketing" motions stating that 
they did in fact continue the very same policy that 
their Social-democratic predecessors pursued.
2. The vulnerable position of the Social-democratic and 
Radical Parties
The problems facing these two parties with repsect to 
the EC may be clearly seen from the following compari-
son of the results of the most recent elections to 
the "Folketing" and to the European Parliament:
Folketing EP elections 
elections June 1984 
Jan. 1984
Leftist Socialists 2.7% 1.3%
Peeples Socialist Party 11.5% 9.2%
Other small anti-EC Parties 2.0% not running
Popular movement against the EC not running 20.8%
Total anti-EC votes 16.2% 31.3%
Social-democratic Party 31.6% 19.5%
Radical Party 5.5% 3.1%
The four parties in Government 43.1% 42.6%
Free Democrats and Progress Party 3.6% 3.5%




























































































The Table shows that the pro EC parties continue to 
dominate in the "Folketing" having 83.8% of the vo­
tes. However, the anti EC share of the electorate is 
roughly on third of the total electorate, which -in 
cidentally - is almost the same as in the 1972 refe­
rendum on Danish membership of the EC.
The discrepancy between the electorate and the "Fol 
keting"in EC matters is,however, not evenly distribu­
ted among the parties. On the contrary it is concen­
trated in the two parties that moved the motion adopt­
ed in the "Folketing" in May 1984, i.e. the Social- 
democratic and the Radical parties.These two parties 
are obviously in a vulnerable position on EC issues, 
having an important fraction of their electorate dis 
agreeing with the policy of the party. They are 
therefore - particularly while in opposition - focus 
ing their concern on how to maintain and (re)estab 
lish the appeal to their electorate.
IV.The differences among the major political parties
While "Folketing debates tend to focus on points of 
agreements in order to continue the big foreign poli 
cy alliance the elections to the European Parliament 
necessarily involves a certain focusing on party dif 
ferences. The various election manifestos adopted 
prior to the European elections bear witness to this.
1. The liberal party
The Liberal Party manifesto to the European elections 
adheres to the general Danish concensus by stressing 
that the Party is basing its policy on the Treaty of 
Rome. However, it goes on to say that the Liberals 




























































































of the EC to act with respect to problems where com­
mon action yields the best results. According to the 
manifesto the national conflicts in the Council of 
Ministers are increasingly blocking for the Community 
interests. The manifesto suggests to strengthen the 
role of the Commission to counteract this development. 
The right of veto is in this vay maintained though 
the manifesto explicitly proposes to abolish the
widespreadmisuse of this right.
*
The Liberals favours an increased influence to the 
European Parliament. This should be achieved on the 
basis of the existing Treaties by way of inter 
institutional agreements. It is suggested that the 
European Parliament in this way should be given the 
right of veto against proposals from the Commission.
The Liberals are also in favour of closer coordinati­
on between the EPC and the Treaty cooperation. In 
particular the Parliament should be more actively 
integrated with the EPC.Such closer coordination 
between the Treaty cooperation and the EPC should 
give the Community a possibility to speak and act on 
behalf of the Member States in order to increase the 
EC influence on the international peace and security.
While defence matters should be left to the NATO, 
European security arrangements should be dealt with 
in the EPC.
The Liberal manifesto also speaks out in favour of a 
generally stronger involvement of the EC in education 






























































































tives in the field of education, in particular with 
respect to vocational training.
It should be stressed, however, that the major part 
of the Liberal manifesto is devoted to the policies 
to be pursued by the EC. The institutional sections 
of the manifesto is, however, important and are - in 
contrast to those of other parties - put in the begin­
ning of the manifesto.lt may easily be seen that the 
Liberal manifesto in form and to a certain extent al­
so in substance differs in tone and content from the 
"Folketing" motion of May 1984, though it remains 
with in its broad concensus as far as the Union is 
concer ned.
2. The Conservative Party.
The Conservative approach to the institutional quest 
ions is more prudent than the Liberal. The Draft Trea­
ty is diplomatically but firmly rejected by a repudi 
ation of "artificial new modes of cooperation which 
do not enjoy any popular support and which is there 
fore endangering the steady but slow progress of the 
CommunityIn the Conservative view the existing 
Treaties are a sufficient basis for the cooperation, 
though it is emphazised that they should be used in a 
more complete way.
Also the Conservative favours a strengthening of the 
role of the Parliament, but they do in fact only envi­
sage a larger controlling function for the Parlia­
ment.
While the Conservatives also favours increased coope­
ration with respect to education, they note that the 




























































































call explicitly for the cooperation to take place 
with in the Community institutions.
The Conservatives differs from the Liberals as to the 
security policy, which in the Conservative view 
should be dealt with in the NATO.
3. The Radical Party.
Compared to the two foregoing manifestos the Radical 
manifesto is quite defensive in its approach. All 
institutional developments and increases in the com 
petence are rejected and the importance of separating 
the Treaty cooperation from cooperation outside the 
Treaty is strongly emphazised. A political or mili­
tary union is specifically rejected as is an economic 
and monetary union. The right of veto is strongly 
stressed.
The Radicals do not foresee any increased role for 
the European Parliament, and the democratic controle 
of the Community must lie with the nationnal Parlia 
ments according to this party.
4. The Social-democratic Party
The Social-democratic manifesto outlines the policies 
which the Party will support in the EC. In a second 
paragraph the manifesto undertakes to oppose inter 
alia:
- changes in the competence of the institutions,
- any erosion in the right of veto,
- any granting of rights to the European Parliament 
in matters of security and defence,





























































































It is obvious that the Social-democratic manifesto - 
like the Radical - is designed to appease the impor­
tant fraction of the Party electorate which is criti 
cal of the EC. The rather poor showing of the Social- 
democratic Party in the European elections is, how 
ever, sometimes explaines exactly as a consequence of 
the lack of a clear profile in an election where a 
number of other parties both to the left and to the 
right could be either for or against further integra­
tion. In an attempt to try to clarify the Party's po 
licy the Social-democrats have recently established a 
committee to study the role of Denmark in Europe and 
of Europe in the world. It will no doubt be of vital 
importance to the Party as well as to the Danish poli­
cy vis-a-vis the EC what this committee may achieve.
V. Summary and conclusions.
1. All leading Danish Parties have in a "folketing" 
motion rejected the Draft Treaty proposed by the 
European Parliament.
2. This rejection is an expression of a broad concensus 
on the approach to the Europeaan Union. The steady 
but slow progress of the Community is prefereed to 
great leaps forward which cannot be implemented for 
want of popular support.
3. The center of gravity in discussions on the future de 
velopment of the Community towards a European Union 
should in the wiev of all Danish Parties be new poli 
cies in the fields of industry, tecnology, research 
and development, energy, etc..General institutional 
reforms are rejected by all parties and the right of 




























































































4. Within this general concensus there is a clear diffe 
rence between the parties with respect to smaller in­
stitutional amandmends. This difference is often not 
clearly expressed due to the necessary alliance among 
the major parties regarding foreign policy including 
EC policy. The Liberals and - to a lesser degree - 
the Conservatives are more open to such smaller 
reforms, while the Social-democrats and the Radicals 
are taking a more defensive attitude in this respect. 
The So cial-democrats have after their poor results 
in the latest European elections set up a committte 
to study their position with respect to the Europe. 
The outcome of this committee is difficult to fore­
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